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Politics costs money.  Television ads, billboards, fliers, phone banks: 
the normal tools of democracy have to be paid for somehow.  Unless 
the government decides to fund every campaign — and to ban anyone 
else from spending money on speech — then politicians will have to 
raise funds of their own. 
In his Comment on political corruption,1 Professor Samuel Issacha-
roff rightly rejects the standard tropes of political corruption — that 
money corrupts, and that lots of money corrupts absolutely.  Issacha-
roff performs a useful service by questioning these traditional accounts 
and by focusing attention instead on the effects that private influence 
can have on government policy.  Unfortunately, the very breadth of his 
analysis runs the risk of turning corruption into too general a category 
to be useful, at least as a ground for legislation.  In this Response, I 
propose a slight refinement on Issacharoff’s model, in the hopes of li-
miting the concept of corruption to a manageable scope. 
So long as private citizens are allowed to favor some candidates 
over others, elected officials will respond in kind, devoting public re-
sources to particular private ends.  No regulation can hope to stop 
that.  What we might hope to control, however, is whether the gov-
ernment favors some candidates over others, by channeling public re-
sources into self-sustaining political machines.  If protecting the gov-
ernment from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least 
attempt to protect the government from itself. 
I.  ISSACHAROFF’S DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
A.  Corruption as Clientelism 
Despite the central role it has played in campaign finance reform, 
the “very concept of corruption was never clearly defined.”2  Some cor-
ruption is easy to classify: government officials can’t trade official acts 
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for personal benefits, like a briefcase full of cash.  Many people view 
campaign contributions and other political spending the same way, as 
a bribe that wealthy interests pay to get the results they want.  But 
campaign expenditures — particularly independent expenditures un-
coordinated with candidates — are more complicated than that.  The 
money doesn’t inure to the candidate’s personal interest, and true quid 
pro quo exchanges are rare (or hard to prove).  In general, the law is 
too blunt an instrument to divide bad contributors from good ones: 
some people spend money to buy a candidate’s loyalty, while others 
use their money to advocate for candidates with whom they share a 
vision of good policy. 
Issacharoff properly rejects the view that campaign contributions 
are inherently corrupting.  He turns away from these “inputs” to focus 
instead on “outputs”: the “policies that result” from the incentives of 
our electoral system.3  Issacharoff’s particular worry is “clientelism,” 
the “patron-client relationship in which political support (votes, atten-
dance at rallies, money) is exchanged for privileged access to public 
goods.”4  As he frames the issue, the problem of corruption is that poli-
ticians “offer private gain from public action to distinct, tightly orga-
nized constituencies, which in turn may be mobilized to keep com-
pliant public officials in office.”5  To fight clientelism, Issacharoff 
would implement a combination of carrots and sticks — offering 
matching funds to encourage small contributions, and restricting the 
political activities of “those in a position to distort public policy — 
such as government contractors” and (perhaps) public-sector unions.6 
B.  Where Does Clientelism Stop? 
This framing of the issue has an intuitive appeal.  But Issacharoff’s 
notion of clientelism also contains something slippery.  “[P]rivate gain 
from public action” isn’t limited to government contractors or big-
ticket individual donors.  Far more often, it’s found in the govern-
ment’s relations to broader social groups with far greater aggregate po-
litical power.  Farmers, homeowners, veterans, retirees: all have orga-
nized means of mobilizing support, as well as financial interests they 
expect the government to serve.  If a candidate supports a cost-of-
living increase in Social Security, and the voters who will receive that 
increase donate to his campaign, is that democracy in action, or a cor-
rupt reward for “offer[ing] private gain”? 
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Those who donate usually believe the former.  But it’s hard, when 
one’s own interests are at stake, to make political decisions “with a 
sole regard to justice and the public good.”7  A century ago, a British 
legal scholar could ask with a straight face whether “the receipt of 
poor relief, in the shape of a pension, shall be consistent with the pen-
sioner’s retaining the right to join in the election of a Member of Par-
liament.”8  By contrast, “if receipt of government largesse were a dis-
qualification,” then “[i]t would take a modern Diogenes with a power-
powerful lamp to find anyone today who could vote.”9 
When politicians put private interests before the public good, they 
act wrongly — even “corruptly.”  But whether a politician is “corrupt” 
in this subjective sense is impossible for the law to police.  The politi-
cians who support a cost-of-living increase in Social Security, even in 
the absence of measured inflation, may be engaged in a public-spirited 
(if selective) attempt to correct for systematic errors in the Consumer 
Price Index.  Or they might see it as a chance to buy off a well-
organized group of voters at the expense of future generations.  Who 
can tell?  The campaign finance system surely can’t, at least not with-
out putting Senators on the stand to testify about their motives.10  And 
if “corruption” isn’t about subjective motives, whether of the candidate 
or of the donor, then all that matters is the output of the process — 
here, a politically powerful group securing a greater share of the public 
fisc.  Whether or not this seems “corrupt” will come down to one’s 
views of good policy. 
This type of soft clientelism is an endemic feature of politics.  It 
was perfectly obvious even to the Framers that “[a] landed interest, a 
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest,”11 
and others would all compete for the benefits of state policy: “Every 
shilling with which they overburden the inferior number is a shilling 
saved to their own pockets.”12  Nor is clientelism, as the concept is 
used in political science, even “confined to politics in a restricted 
sense.”13  Rather, it “proliferates in the arts, academia, religious con-
gregations, the media, and business, wherever there is the power to 
appoint and grant access to benefits, goods, services, influence, and 
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honors.”14  Self-interested actions abound whenever people are given a 
choice — and we cannot get rid of them unless we also get rid of 
choices.  “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without 
which it instantly expires.  But it could not be a less folly to abolish li-
berty . . . because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the an-
nihilation of air . . . .”15 
C.  Where Should Regulation Start? 
Issacharoff is aware of this problem, and admits that clientelism is 
“inescapable” in a democracy.16  He is content, in the absence of “pre-
cise substantive lines,” to focus on what he considers the worst cases 
— the “express lanes” of private influence,17 through which “important 
sectional supporters” may “‘gain privileged access to public resources’ 
for profit.”18  But when the problem is framed as broadly as “clientel-
ism,” it’s hard to tell which cases are the worst.  The politics of Social 
Security and Medicare do far more damage to the public fisc than a 
relatively tiny amount of earmarked spending.  And no smoke-filled-
room commitment could be better entrenched against public criticism 
than a farm-state Senator’s endorsement of farm subsidies.  When the 
government’s budget is so heavily dominated by transfers among dif-
ferent groups, throwing up roadblocks to one pathway of private in-
fluence may just increase the relative force of another.  Why care 
about relative advantage, if the game is so thoroughly rigged? 
Consider Issacharoff’s central proposal for additional regulation.  
He favors further restrictions on the activities of federal contractors19 
— who cannot make direct campaign contributions while their con-
tracts are in effect20 — because such contractors have a “double hold” 
on policy, exercising influence once in the political arena and again at 
the bargaining table.21  Issacharoff analogizes these contractors to pub-
lic employee unions, which have done very well for themselves by 
combining the political power of an interest group with the coercive 
power of a collective bargaining unit.22 
The analogy, however, also shows the limits of the argument.  A 
public-sector union may be a concentrated interest group, but more 
importantly it’s a monopolist: the government is forced to negotiate 
with the union because the law says so.  When the government buys 
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goods or services from a monopoly provider, similar forces may be at 
work — just as they are in the broader economy, where monopoly 
power means consumers pay more.  But when the government buys 
some competitive good like paper clips, the contract is not a source of 
influence; it is only one particular purpose to which influence may be 
put.  And even if contract negotiations themselves “bypass the normal 
process of interest group bargaining,”23 an agency’s overall budget 
does not.  Much of the time, a contractor may have no more influence 
than anyone else seeking government largesse — and the influence it 
has may be owed less to campaign spending than to personal connec-
tions or ties to a particular congressional district.24 
That, perhaps, is why Issacharoff sees regulation of government 
contractors as merely “a partial inroad” into “the sector of the economy 
that does not face incumbent state officials as contracting parties but 
as subjects of regulation.”25  In other words, all of the economy.  Issa-
charoff’s broader goal of “insulat[ing] politics from the demands of 
those who would use public power for nonpublic-regarding aims”26 
will only be achieved when nobody is allowed to vote. 
II.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
The difficulty of confining anti-clientelist reforms within any ma-
nageable limits suggests that we should look elsewhere.  Issacharoff, 
however, implicitly points to an alternative framing of the problem, 
when he suggests that those subject to campaign finance regulation 
“may welcome such a law as a protection against public officials intent 
on using their position to solicit funds for campaign expenditures.”27  
Rather than trying to protect government resources from private ac-
tors, we might focus on protecting those resources from the politicians 
themselves — that is, preventing the diversion of government re-
sources into self-funding political machines.  That focus might avoid 
some of the gauziness of Issacharoff’s platform, while explaining his 
policy proposals’ intuitive appeal. 
A.  The Fight Against Machines 
The United States already has substantial experience with govern-
ment-funded politics.  Under the nineteenth-century spoils system — a 
clientelist system if there ever was one — government employees were 
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added to the public payroll in exchange for redirecting a substantial 
chunk of their salaries back to the party hierarchy.  By 1878, as much 
as “ninety percent of the money raised by the Republican congressional 
committee came from assessments on federal officeholders.”28 
Today, the Hatch Act restricts the political activities of certain fed-
eral employees.29  The Supreme Court has explained this restriction as 
designed to prevent officeholders from using the government work-
force “to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political 
machine,” with “hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for 
at public expense,” staffing a single party’s “political structure and po-
litical campaigns.”30  By taking voluntary political activity off the ta-
ble, the Act reduces the danger that government employees will be 
coerced into “perform[ing] political chores in order to curry favor with 
their superiors.”31 
B.  The Anti-Machine Approach 
Whether these particular limitations (or any others) are compatible 
with the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Response.32  But 
viewing campaign finance regulations through an anti-machine lens 
could provide a useful limitation on overly general pictures of clientel-
ist politics.  While both visions concern the diversion of public re-
sources into private hands, the anti-machine approach addresses a par-
ticular type of diversion, one that uniquely benefits incumbent 
politicians.  Whether a contractor seeks a plum contract in return for a 
donation, or an official demands a contribution before the contract 
goes through, the result of the kickback is that excess public spending 
winds up directly in the politician’s own war chest.33  The particular 
problem with government contractors is not that they are in a “posi-
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tion to distort public policy”34 — aren’t we all? — but that they are 
more liable to be misused by, and thus need protection from, those in 
government. 
More importantly, political machines can pose a greater danger to 
democracy than any mere handful of contractors on the make.  If poli-
ticians are spending a few million here and there for private gain, we 
only lose the money.  But if the candidates who won the last election 
can vote themselves ever larger campaign treasuries, it will be that 
much harder to unseat them in the next election.  A clientelist Con-
gress still must search for patrons, but a self-sustaining machine is far 
less susceptible to democratic control. 
An anti-machine approach also helps clarify which problems are 
easily remediable through legislation and which are not.  Without 
committing to a particular political platform, no anticorruption effort 
can identify which government programs are actually diverting public 
resources to private gain.  (Student loans?  Veterans’ benefits?  The 
mortgage interest tax deduction?)  But when the government embarks 
on a large-scale spending or regulatory project, only a vanishingly 
small proportion of the money changing hands will actually return to 
candidates in the form of contributions.  These programs are largely 
enacted for independent reasons; some good, some bad.  By contrast, 
there are plenty of government giveaways that virtually no one would 
support, but for their propensity to show up later in a political cam-
paign fund.35  The broader and more transparent the program (block 
transportation grants for states, say, rather than funds for individual 
bridges), the harder it will be for machines to capture. 
In other words, the goal of anti-machine regulation would be to en-
sure that political self-dealing can only be done inefficiently, at much 
greater budgetary cost, and with most of the spending going elsewhere.  
That may seem strange.  But tying self-dealing to larger projects 
means that each abuse will cost enough money for someone else to no-
tice.  (As usual, sunlight is the best disinfectant.)  If the goal of cam-
paign finance reform is achievable change, rather than a wholesale re-
vision of the democratic process, an anti-machine framework might do 
better than the “clientelism” label at explaining why the worst offend-
ers are really the worst. 
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C.  Machines and Matching Grants 
The anti-machine approach may also make better sense of Issacha-
roff’s other policy proposal: public matching grants for small individu-
al donations.36  The 2008 election saw an extraordinary outpouring of 
small donations to presidential candidates.37  Matching, say, the first 
$100 of each donation with government funds would encourage candi-
dates to seek broad-based financial support, and would double the im-
portance of small donors as compared to government contractors or 
corporate fat cats. 
Stated in this fashion, a program of matching donations plainly has 
nothing to do with clientelism — understood in the very general sense 
as politics that directs public resources into private hands.  Perhaps 
small donors are thought to be less greedy than large ones (or, because 
they have less money, just bad at it).  But plenty of large donors act for 
public-spirited — or “ideological” — reasons, and plenty of small do-
nors expect material benefits from the candidates they support.  Be-
coming “the farmers’ candidate” or “the candidate of Social Security” 
is much easier if $100 donations from farmers and retirees have 
doubled in value.  Matching might reduce the relative influence of the 
most concentrated special interests, but it increases the influence of 
somewhat-less-special interests that are still better organized than av-
erage.38  (Would public-sector unions be more or less powerful if their 
members’ donations were doubled?) 
In the terminology of the Supreme Court, matching grants are ac-
tually aimed at “distortion,” the presumed discrepancy between a 
view’s actual popularity and its expression in political speech.39  
Matching makes some voices louder and others less so.  As a result, it 
reproduces all the problems of the distortion rationale: how does the 
government decide whose voices, supporting which policies, deserve 
greater influence?40  In some ways, matching would make the distor-
tion problem even worse.  The class of those inclined to donate $100 is 
even more limited, and demographically less diverse, than the embar-
rassingly small group of Americans who vote.  If matching grants be-
came a significant force in elections, we might expect to see politicians 
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trying harder (than they already do) to promote the interests of Ameri-
ca’s mass upper class.41  Whether or not that would be a bad thing, it 
sure wouldn’t be populist. 
What matching could do, though, is make progress against the spe-
cifically political diversion of government funds.  Any spending pro-
gram sufficiently broad-based to attract $100 donations would be un-
likely to funnel much of its spending back into politicians’ coffers.  In 
one sense, of course, matching donations is an odd idea: to prevent co-
vert government subsidies of political campaigns, it requires overt gov-
ernment subsidies of political campaigns.  The point, however, is to 
make those subsidies in a more evenhanded way. 
Whether matching is worth the cost is an open question.  But it 
makes more sense as a means of forestalling machine politics than as a 
means of turning politics away from private gain. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF REFORM 
A final, and perhaps paradoxical, advantage of an anti-machine 
framework is that it so clearly leaves many other problems unad-
dressed.  The temptation in campaign finance reform is to imagine 
that politicians can, in a single stroke, repeal the logic of collective ac-
tion.  They can’t.  No matter what law is passed tomorrow, concen-
trated interest groups will still win out against broader but less orga-
nized coalitions.  As Issacharoff noted in an earlier work, “political 
money, like water, has to go somewhere.”42  An effort to prevent indi-
viduals and groups from spending their own money to advocate for 
politicians they support will either fail, or will succeed at too great a 
cost to the First Amendment to be worthwhile.  The government can 
certainly try to put its own resources to proper use — but it can’t keep 
private interests out of politics. 
For this reason, reformers trying to improve public policy should 
pay attention not only to legal institutions, but also to the broader po-
litical culture.  Many countries still have widespread clientelism in the 
traditional sense, with plenty of bribery and spoils mixed in.  In others 
— including, with all its problems, the United States — politics is fun-
damentally much healthier.  The reason isn’t just the wisdom of our 
campaign finance regulation: bribery is illegal pretty much every-
where.  Far more important than these “parchment barriers”43 is a cul-
tural commitment to a politics centered on producing public goods, not 
transferring resources from one hand to another. 
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The political culture also has a great deal to do with the structure 
of campaign finance.  Part of the reason why campaigning is so expen-
sive is that so few people will follow politics for free.  Media coverage, 
word of mouth, and positive “buzz” are worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars in paid advertising,44 and could be worth even more if more 
people paid attention to them.  Again, as Issacharoff has rightly noted 
in a prior article, the most problematic thing about “media-intensive, 
idea-sparse, special-interest-funded campaign tactics” is that they may 
work.45 
Furthermore, if the demand for special treatment is endemic in a 
democracy, perhaps reformers should focus on the supply.  There is 
always more room for clientelism when more of the economy is subject 
to political control.  Likewise, if unenacted earmarks in committee re-
ports, congressional interference in contract negotiations, or special 
pleading to create jobs in particular industries were seen as outrages 
rather than daily events, there would be fewer avenues to transfer pub-
lic revenues to private hands.  As Issacharoff notes, “lobbies for special 
interests can sometimes succeed where matters are detailed or complex 
but not when they are general and simple.”46  Channeling the emo-
tional energy behind campaign finance reform into a push for simplici-
ty and transparency in government would help counter the powerful 
political pressures to keep government complex, expensive, and firmly 
in the private interest. 
None of these goals can be achieved by enactment.  What refor-
mers can look forward to is not a single broad stroke of perfectly de-
signed legislation, but “an unceasing struggle to clear paths through 
the jungle.”47  Issacharoff’s effort to flesh out the concept of corruption 
is an extremely useful start.  But recognizing the very difficulty of con-
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